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Abstract: Communication about prediction is complex in a number of ways. First, language is by nature recursive 
— language is an indicator of meaning as well as a force that shapes meaning. Second, the same language used to 
communicate prediction in uncertain environments is used for other purposes. In this article, we describe how the 
recursive nature of language impacted the choices we made in a cross-sectional longitudinal study aimed at 
gaining insight into children’s language repertoires relating to conjecture. We then explore some Grade 6 
students’ communication about prediction to develop insight into their meaning and meaning-making with 
prediction language. From this we raise questions about interpreting data from such contexts. Finally, we discuss 
implications for educators. 
Keywords: mathematics education, language, degrees of certainty, conjecture, authority. 
 
The understanding of possibility, risk, and certainty, like the understanding of any mathematical 
idea, is mediated by language. Certain language repertoires are necessary to convey the ideas. At the 
same time, the language used to describe these ideas shapes the way people conceptualize them. This 
recursive nature of language compelled us to develop a research project to investigate children’s 
language repertoires in relation to conjecture. Having noted similarities in the language of conjecture 
and of prediction, we structured the classroom activities and interviews in the project to prompt students 
to make predictions. In this paper, we focus on our research choices in relation to this endeavour. First, 
we describe choices we made to gain insight into children’s language repertoires. Second, we use some 
of the data from the project to identify issues relating to interpreting data in the characteristically 
mathematical contexts of conjecture and prediction. 
Moving beyond our academic interest in mathematics education, we will argue that the issues we 
identify may be significant for understanding everyday experience. In particular, we will raise questions 
about the impact of mathematics class experiences that involve uncertainty on experience outside the 
classroom. We will also raise questions about the impact of intertextuality between uniquely 
mathematical ways of communicating about conjecture and everyday ways of interacting about 
authority. 
The investigation of conjectures (hypotheses) is one of the most important mathematical 
processes. Much mathematics teaching focuses on enabling students to perform particular mathematical 
procedures, such as adding fractions, factoring polynomials, and calculating probability. These skills 
appear as standards in curriculum documents and frameworks (e.g., CCSSO, 2010) that are used by 
curriculum planners and teachers. Research and professional literature, including curricula (e.g. New 
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Brunswick Department of Education, 2010) and curriculum frameworks, point to the necessity of 
students learning these intended outcomes through the exploration of mathematical problems.  
When people explore a mathematical problem together, as with mathematical investigations in 
classrooms, it is necessary to have a way of suggesting an idea before knowing it is true. Rowland 
(2000) noted the centrality of such conjecture to mathematics, and coined this “space between what we 
believe and what we are willing to assert” (p. 142) as the Zone of Conjectural Neutrality (ZCN). 
Because of the recursive relationship between language and experience, the language resources available 
affect the possibilities for making conjectures. 
As our research exemplifies, the language of conjecture shares language that describes 
probability. Rowland’s work refers often to the necessity of expressing uncertainty for conjecture, and 
he draws heavily on linguistics literature that describes the way people express uncertainty.  Our 
research illustrates the complex relationship between probability, itself an important mathematical 
concept, and conjecture, which is at the heart of teaching for understanding. 
Our interest in language is not aimed to identify correct language. Rather it focuses on the 
language students use and asks what their language choices might tell us about the way they think about 
uncertainty. There is a range of English words that relate to uncertainty. Mathematics educators are 
likely to have particular ideas of what the words mean, which would differ from ideas of others. For 
example, in addition to everyday use of the word ‘risk,’ the concept has been studied in the fields of 
mathematics, psychology, business, and engineering. We find a general consensus that it references 
probability and uncertainty, especially as they relate to (perceived) consequences (e.g., Slovic, 2000). 
Our focus in this article is on the meaning and meaning-making we observe while students are 
confronted with uncertainty. 
 
Communicating About Uncertainty 
Our theoretical perspective for this research draws on the work of Vygotsky (e.g., 1962, 1978) 
and Wertsch (1991) related to the connections between thought and language, and, in particular, the 
central role that language as social interaction plays in the process of learning.  
Nevertheless, we have found it a challenge to avoid deficit framing because of the shaping force 
of one’s language repertoire. Indeed, we suggest that it is not possible to completely avoid deficit 
framing when analyzing language use. Deficit framing suggests that one’s own way of speaking or 
thinking is superior by evaluating whether or not others have acquired the same skills. In the study of 
linguistic variation for numbers, which is the only area of mathematics register variation that has been 
documented significantly, Swetz (2009) pointed out how cultures have been rated on the scope of their 
number systems. In our research we are more interested in the potential for linguistic variation to open 
up opportunities to understand mathematics differently. For example, in the context of language 
repertoires for number, numbers are verbs in Mi’kmaq  (Lunney Borden, 2010). Our conversations 
among ethnomathematicians suggest that this is not uncommon, though in English, numbers are 
adjectives or nouns. A question warranting attention is how this distinction affects one’s conception of 
counting and arithmetic operations.  
We want to bring the same kind of question to the study of different language repertoires for 
expressing uncertainty. However, at this point, we focus on the range of language strategies within 
English and French. In this article, we focus on English only. Thus our research addresses the larger 
question: How does linguistic variation express itself in relation to understanding probability? Because 
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linguistic variation in mathematics (besides the area of number) has not been researched significantly, 
the discussion requires careful research to move forward. 
Reports on research of probability learning have included many examples of language spoken 
and written by children and their teachers. The same can be said about most subfields of inquiry in 
mathematics education, in which reporting generally focuses on understanding without significant 
consideration of the language that mediates this understanding. Morgan et al. (2014) have said that this 
approach is naïve: “Naïve conceptions of language as a transparent means of transmission of ideas from 
speaker to listener have been seriously challenged by current thinking about communication” (p. 847). A 
further naiveté identified by Morgan et al. (2014) is evident in research that views “language as a barrier 
to learning that must be overcome” (p. 846).  
Our review of the subfield of inquiry into probability learning identifies the first kind of naiveté 
(language as a transparent window) and thankfully not the second (language as a barrier). We position 
our article as a small first step away from the naïve use of language as a transparent window into 
probability understanding. It is a small step because we merely problematize apparent meaning-making. 
The concern we have in our reporting is that it may be taken as a caution to speak and write more 
clearly, which would relate to the second kind of naiveté. Rather, we will claim that ambiguity is 
inevitable. However, it is important to understand the nature of this ambiguity.  
We see some development of attention to language and related developments in its 
conceptualization within the subfield of research on probability teaching and learning. Ben-Zvi and 
associates moved from a naïve conception of language as transparent medium to language in interaction 
with activity.  Ben-Zvi and Arcavi (2001) conducted a study that is similar to ours in many ways. They 
explored the conceptions of data among children of a similar age to children in our study. In their 
analysis, they attended carefully to the linguistic distinctions made by their participants. They identified 
the distinctions among the things said by their participants as representations of different 
conceptualizations: “The verbal abilities of these students allowed us to follow, at a very fine level of 
detail, the ways in which they begin to make sense of data, data representations, and the ‘culture’ of data 
handling and analysis” (p. 35). This is an example of research that conceptualizes language as a 
transparent window into understanding. Later, Ben-Zvi et al. (2012) presented a more complex 
conceptualization of language, as they trace its development in individuals as they interact with 
increasingly complex probability tasks: “prediction tasks, helped in promoting the students’ probabilistic 
language” (p. 913). 
The research we describe in this article is inspired by an unexpected result from an earlier 
collaboration that was focused on authority in mathematics classrooms (e.g., Herbel-Eisenmann, 
Kristmanson & Wagner, 2011; Herbel-Eisenmann & Wagner, 2010), for which we drew on Rowland 
(2000) for interpretation of students’ use of modal verbs. The ambiguity of meaning among modal verbs 
highlighted our attention to the two mathematical phenomena of probability and reasoning. Our current 
attention to modal verbs was bolstered by the strong attention to modal verbs in literature on additional 
language teaching and on teaching in multilingual contexts. Thus our interest in uncertainty focuses us 
on participants’ repertoires for expressing modality, especially on the use of modal verbs. 
Modality 
Modality refers to linguistic tools for expressing degrees of certainty, for example the use of 
modal verbs like must and could. “It must be six” is stronger, and thus has higher modality than “It could 
be six.” Rowland (2000) identified assertions that appear without expressions of modality as root 
modality. These assertions, which may be called bald assertions, are stronger than even the highest 
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modal expressions because saying ‘it is six’ does not even recognize the question of other possibilities. 
Figure 1 illustrates a range of meanings of modal verbs (from Herbel-Eisenmann, Kristmanson & 
Wagner, 2011, p. 2). 
it is six high polarity (root modality) 










y high modality 
low modality 
high modality 
it might be six 
it could be six 
it cannot be six 
it is not six low polarity (root modality) 
Figure 1. Range of meanings of modal verbs 
Some modal verbs—e.g., ‘can’—are ambiguous. “You can be excused from the table” indicates 
a degree of obligation; “You can finish the race” indicates ability; “I can help you” indicates inclination; 
and “It can be a six (because one of the remaining cards in the deck is a six)” indicates probability. 
When students (or others) hear the word can, we wonder what it means to them? Linguists, Martin and 
Rose (2005), codified these forms of meaning of ambiguous modality language, including categories 
that describe degrees of certainty relating to usuality, probability, obligation, inclination, and ability (p. 
50).  Their distinction between usuality and probability is not very clear to us. Rowland (2000) 
distinguished among the various meanings using the terms alethic (or logical), deontic, and epistemic.  
Alethic modality is most relevant to communication about probability. For example, in such a context, 
“the next card could be a six” is a statement of certainty if one knows that there is a six in the pile from 
which cards are being drawn. However, could often expresses doubt. Deontic modality references 
obligation or authority. Epistemic modality references levels of belief and thus is most important in 
conjecture. 
Modality can be expressed using other language strategies, in addition to modal verbs. For 
example, the adverb ‘probably’ expresses strong confidence short of certainty, and the adverb ‘possibly’ 
represents the opposite end of the scale, with approximately the same modality (the same level of 
certainty), but strong confidence that an event is nearly impossible. However, there are no standardized 
quantifications of these expressions in everyday use. Nevertheless, in quantitative research 
methodologies certain expressions of modality are taken to have numeric thresholds relating to 
correlation coefficients, for example. Similarly, in textbooks and other resources for learners of 
additional languages, modal verbs have appeared with numeric ranges given as percents. 
In addition to the alethic and epistemic modality, which relate most closely to probability and 
reasoning respectively, our analysis will identify modal expressions as referencing emotions — for 
example, desires and fears. Pratt et al. (2012) demonstrated the influence of emotion in their study of the 
priority heuristic. The participants’ worries influenced their assessment of probabilistic situations due to 
empathy for the subject of the context story, which was related to the risk in a medical procedure.  One 
of the conclusions the researchers draw from their study is that “Teaching about risk carries with it 
certain obligations. We see one pedagogic challenge as sensitising people to their own decision-making, 
including their emotionally-charged heuristic thinking” (p. 940). 
Our analysis will focus on the range of meaning in participants’ language choices, not on the 
conceptualization of probability. Nevertheless, our data could provide examples of various heuristics 
and misconceptions identified in the stochastic reasoning literature. Most prominently, we see our 
participants straddling the boundary between what Fischbein (1975) referred to as ‘primary intuitions’ 
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and ‘secondary intuitions’. The primary intuitions are “cognitive acquisitions which are derived from the 
experience of the individual, without the need for any systematic instruction”, and the ‘secondary 
intuitions’ are “acquisitions that have all the characteristics of intuitions but . . . are formed by scientific 
education, mainly in school” (p. 117). The finer-grained distinction developed by Jones et al. (1999) — 
distinguishing among prestructural, unistructural, multistructural, and relational thinking — could be 
used to identify student thinking on Fischbein’s fuzzy boundary, but we are more interested in 
distinctions in language than on rating or evaluating children’s understanding.  
As noted above, we are especially interested in the way children use language to express 
modality in mathematics contexts (and beyond) because modality is important in conjecture, as noted by 
Rowland, and to describe uncertainty, and it is also important to understand other points of view, as 
noted by Shaffer (2006). In our research, we did not aim to look for holes in children’s language 
repertoires. Rather, we focused on attending to the ways they talked about their understanding, to help us 
see a range of ways to talk about and understand conjecture and uncertainty. 
 
Methodological Choices 
The data for our cross-sectional longitudinal study comprise audio- and video-recordings from 
English-medium and French Immersion instructional contexts in an Anglophone region in Canada. 
Students worked in groups in class and were subsequently interviewed, extending the group work. At the 
end of the interviews we asked the students about the meaning of the words they used to describe 
degrees of certainty: How do the participants distinguish between obligation and probability, as noted 
above?  
For each mathematical context we tried to avoid using specialized mathematical language 
ourselves. We know from second language acquisition literature that good language learners are 
generally good at noticing and, subsequently, using the language used in interactions with more able 
speakers (Long, 1996). Furthermore, people tend to follow the grammatical patterns of their 
interlocutors, for example in research interviews  (Wagner, 2003). We wanted to hear what language 
skills the children in our research used to communicate their ideas without setting them up with the 
specialist language to build on. As we struggled to construct problems without use of specialist 
language, we found that larger narrative contexts made this possible. Other strategies we considered 
became grammatically awkward.  
Our narratives also made the problems accessible to very young children, perhaps partially 
because of the lack of specialty language, but mostly, we think, because they connect to children’s 
experience. If we were interested in assessing the level of probability knowledge among our participants, 
we would have to be wary of the effect our narrative contexts could have on supporting their developing 
conceptualizations. Pratt & Noss (2002) engaged children in micro-world exploration and noted how 
their understanding developed through their experience within the research. The same caution would 
apply if we were interested in rating or assessing our participants’ language repertoires. As noted by 
Ben-Zvi et al. (2012), whom we cited above, their participants seemed to develop language for 
describing probability when engaging in well-constructed tasks involving increasingly challenging 
questions about uncertainty. However, we are not as interested in rating our participants’ understanding 
and language, as we are in documenting the range of language repertoires used to interact with uncertain 
contexts. 
In addition to embedding our questions in a narrative context, we attempted to avoid specialized 
uncertainty language when we interviewed participants about their predictions in contexts based on 
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uncertainty. At first, our team agreed it would be acceptable to use a language strategy only after the 
participant did, not before. This proved extremely difficult; indeed, in the interviews we often used 
words we intended to avoid, and sometimes used incorrect or awkward structures in attempts to avoid 
this. After completing most of the first year’s classroom and interview interactions, we agreed amongst 
our team that we should be less paranoid about avoiding specialty language, but thought that this issue 
might impact the interpretation of the data. 
The first year’s participants were in Grades 3, 6, and 9. We had them play a modified version of 
skunk, a game often used in the teaching of probability (e.g., Brutlag, 1994; Neller & Presser, 2004). We 
had them play in pairs so that they would be more likely to talk with each other about their ideas and 
strategies. We introduced the game with a narrative like this, varying slightly between contexts because 
we did not script the narrative:  
One day, I was picking strawberries in the forest. After a while, when my basket was 
quite full, a skunk wandered into the berry patch. I ran away so the skunk would not 
spray me. I lost the berries in my basket when I ran off. 
This narrative also gave a reason for calling the game skunk. Participants had a pile of beans 
(representing the berry patch), a cup (the basket), and a bowl (home). When the researcher rolled the die 
and called out the number, participants put that number of berries in their basket. A six represented the 
skunk. When it was rolled, everyone would lose the berries in their baskets. On the other hand, if they 
“went home” (dumping their beans into their bowl) before the appearance of the skunk, their berries 
were safe. We played seven rounds — one berry-picking expedition for each day of the week.  
We played the game with participants in their classrooms first. The following day we 
interviewed groups of students and played again but with six cards bearing the numbers one to six 
instead of the die. The interviewer would not replace the cards into the deck until the deck was 
completely played out, at which time it would be reshuffled. Thus the participants experienced the 
difference between independent and mutually exclusive events in probabilistic situations.  
	  
Figure 2: Skunk cards 
During the game, the interviewer asked the participants to say why they made their choices about 
when to “go home.” After the game, the interviewer asked participants about specific things they said, 
asking for clarification on meaning. The camera operator was helpful in this regard, acting as a second 
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interviewer. She or he could make notes on what participants said, which was relatively difficult for the 
primary interviewer who was busy with the cards and interaction. 
For this article, we focus on one interview with four Grade 6 students playing the game of skunk. 
This group of students was not identified by their teacher as exceptional in any way. The school is in an 
area that has relatively low socio-economic indicators. As noted above, these four students played skunk 
in class the day before, and subsequently one of our research team interviewed them — first playing 
skunk with cards instead of a die, and then asking them about some language meanings. We asked them 
to play skunk in pairs, and they somehow came to an implied agreement that the pairs were competing 
against each other. 
Though we focus on the interview with the four students described above, we make some 
references in our discussion to other data within the project to illuminate certain findings through 
comparison. For this reason we describe the second year research prompts as well. Instead of playing 
skunk, participants from Grades 4, 7, and 10 (catching some of the same students as the previous year, 
one grade earlier) predicted the 50th car on different trains based on the first seven cars. The narrative 
context of this situation had the researcher tell a story about waiting with a friend for a train at a level 
crossing, and deciding to predict what kind of car the fiftieth car would be. Trains were then shown 
using presentation software, with an engine and the first six or seven cars, each labelled with their 
number, as shown in Figure 3. After students made their predictions about the 50th car, we had the train 
accelerate and then decelerate to settle on the 50th car. As with the game of skunk, we had students work 
in groups to draw out communication. 
	  
Figure 3: First train 
The sequences presented to students varied considerably to defy expectations of certain kinds of 
patterns. The cars were distinguishable by colour and shape — Yellow (Y) cars were rectangular 
boxcars, green (G) cars were tankers, and blue (B) cars were flatbeds carrying big triangles. Train 1 
showed Y,G,B,Y,G,B,Y and continued with a pattern of threes (YGB). Train 2 showed Y,G,Y,Y,G,Y 
and continued with a pattern that increased the number of Ys before each G — i.e.,  
Y,G,Y,Y,G,Y,Y,Y,G, etc. Of course, the initial seven cars could have suggested a pattern of threes 
(YGY) similar to the previous train — i.e., Y,G,Y,Y,G,Y,Y,G,Y, etc. For this train, we stopped the train 
at around the 25th car to let students reconsider their predictions. We invited students to tell us their 
reasoning whenever possible. Train 3 showed B,G,B,B,G,G, etc. and continued with B, B, B, G, G, G, 
etc. with increasing groups of B and G.  The interviews on the following day started with Train 4 
showing Y,B,G,Y,Y,B,G. It continued with groups of four (YBGY) — i.e., Y,B,G,Y,Y,B,G,Y etc. Train 
5 started with Y,B,G,B,P,B,Y and continued with a random collection of cars, in which the colours 
started to misalign with the shapes and new kinds of cars appeared, including ones carrying animals. As 
with Train 2, we stopped train 5 at around the 25th car so we could talk with the students as they 
reconsidered their predictions. In addition to the confounding randomness of the fifth, (perhaps “avant-
garde”) train, there was no 50th car — it had only 42 cars. As with skunk, we ended these interviews with 
questions about distinctions among various language choices we heard the students use. 
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Language Used to Express Uncertainty 
The four 11- and 12-year olds in the group whose interview we focus on for this article show 
considerable language repertoires, which we found to be the case for even the most mathematically and 
linguistically novice students in this project, even the Grade 3 French Immersion students who were in 
their first year of French-medium learning. As noted above, we were the most careful about and 
attentive to modal verbs in our analysis because of our earlier research and teaching work, but we 
identify other ways to describe levels of certainty as well. We present here a narrative of the game 
played in the interview, followed with more detailed analysis of the discussion about the meaning of 
some key modal verbs. 
Playing skunk 
We began the interview with a question about the dice version of the skunk game played in class 
the day before: “You know how the skunk came on the six, what if the rule was that the skunk came on 
the three instead of the six? Would you get more berries or less?” (turn 30). The students demonstrated 
either a misconception (possibly due to the prevalence of sixes and the paucity of threes on the day 
before) or based their answers on primary intuition.  Nevertheless, they gave a few expressions that they 
seemed to feel had similar meaning.  Chris discounted the “difference” between the two sets of rules by 
saying “It wouldn’t really make much of a difference” (turn 31). Dale needed no special language to 
agree, simply saying, “No” (turn 32). Chris added the expression “an even chance” with an indicator of 
reasoning — ‘because’: “Because they are all an even chance” (turn 33). Finally, Terry said, “it’s just 
the roll of the dice” (turn 38), apparently using the word ‘just’ to suggest that nothing different happens 
with either set of rules. Thus there seemed to be four different ways of expressing the idea that the 
probability remained unchanged. 
We then moved to playing skunk with the cards. After shuffling the deck of six cards, the first 
cards played were the 2, the 1, and then the skunk.  Each pair of students lost the three berries collected 
before the skunk had arrived. The three cards (2, 1, and skunk) were laying face up on the table. The 
interviewer, holding the remaining three cards, gestured that the students should decide to stay or go 
home. Dale pointed at the skunk card and said, “Well, the skunk is right there” (turn 74). Dale needed no 
special language to indicate certainty — the gesture along with the bald assertion sufficed. 
The interviewer then drew attention to the next unrevealed card: “Okay, so what about this one?” 
(turn 84). Chris responded with, “That would be like around five.” This expression employs a mix of 
uncertainty language. “Would be” expresses prediction. “Like” lowers the modality even more, as does 
“around” (though it is more normally used to describe estimation). 
The 4, and the 3 were played next so five cards now laid face up on the table (2, 1, skunk, 4, 3). 
Chris asked, “Do you have a second skunk in there?” (turn 95). The interviewer was surprised by this 
question and responded, “I showed you the cards before. What cards were they?” (turn 96). Chris again 
expressed doubt, “Trickster” (turn 97). Chris seemed to think the interviewer might have secretly 
switched one of the cards. 
The interviewer played out the deck, picked up the cards and shuffled them. This time the skunk 
came out first. One of the pairs of students went home before the skunk was played and thus averted 
losing their berries. The interviewer asked, “Did you know? Did you know that this was the skunk?” 
(turn 124). Chris said, “No, I just, kind of had a feeling” (turn 126). Dale said, “had a feeling” (turn 127) 
simultaneously with Chris. This reference to having a feeling did not seem to be associated with 
emotion. Rather, it seemed to be a strategy for expressing the act of prediction. Interestingly, both Chris 
and Dale introduced the expression simultaneously. 
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By contrast, close to the end of the game, emotion became palpable and the students talked about 
risk. Chris said, “Don’t want to take our chances” (turn 160). Leslie then reacted with emotion to the 
emergence of the skunk as the first card of the newly shuffled deck (this was the second time the skunk 
was the first card in the deck): “Oh, come on!” (turn 164) laughing with what appeared to be a mix of 
delight and frustration. After the five remaining cards were played out, for which the students wisely 
elected to stay in the berry patch, the cards were reshuffled and the students discussed their strategy in 
earnest. Leslie said, “I’m scared” (p. 191), expressing emotion but perhaps also expressing awareness of 
the possibility of the skunk appearing early in the deck again. Terry assessed the risk of loss in relation 
to the possibility of catching up to the other pair: “I mean, if you guys still stay, then we really don’t 
have anything to lose” (turn 198). Later Terry added, “One of us won’t lose everything” (turn 204), and 
Leslie responded, “It is probably going to be us” (line 205). This instance of ‘probably’ seemed to be 
based both on calculation and fear. 
As noted in the above narrative, for each idea there seemed to be more than one way of 
expressing it, including very simple statements that indicated agreement with another utterance. Also 
noted above, the prediction, conjecture, and emotion seem to be intertwined in the students’ utterances. 
Discussing meanings of modal verbs 
We turn now to analysis of the modal verbs. The modal verb have expresses high modality 
because it refers to events that must occur. The interviewer used it first (though trying to avoid doing so) 
in turn 111, but it did not get used again until turn 229 when Chris talked about the difference between 
playing skunk with cards and with the die: “It’s easier this way because when the skunk first came you 
just don’t have to worry.” It wasn’t used again until the interviewer asked questions about its meaning. 
Here is an abbreviated version of that discussion (omitting diversions).  
319 Interviewer: [Yesterday] I heard Terry say when you're working in your groups, “Do we 
both have to write this down?” So what’s the difference between “it has to be the skunk” and 
“she has to write this down”? Is the “has to” the same? “This has to be the skunk.”  “She has to 
write it down.” Do you notice a difference between them? 
... 
346 Terry: Do we both need to, like, do we both need to write it down? 
347 Interviewer: No, but it’s a proper use of the word. But is it the same as “this has to be the 
skunk”? 
348 Terry: No. 
349 Interviewer: No? Why not? 
350 Terry: Because you know it has to be. 
351 Dale: It absolutely has to be. 
352 Interviewer: It absolutely has to be. 
353 Terry: Yeah. 
354 Interviewer: But when asking “do you have to” it’s not absolutely. 
355 Terry: No, yeah. 
356 Interviewer: Okay 
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357 Dale: Because the fire bell or something could ring or something and you all go outside and 
you don’t have to write it down. 
358 Interviewer: Don’t have to write it down but if the fire bell rung this would still be the 
skunk. 
359 Dale: It would still be the skunk. 
We note that, to clarify meaning, the students introduce new vocabulary that was not part of the 
interview up to this point. Terry used the modal verb structure “need to” to emphasize the necessity of 
“have to.” Dale introduced the adverb absolutely to further emphasize this sense. The students 
distinguished between instances of ‘have to’ depending on context. 
We had a similar conversation about the modal verb can which had been used in its various 
forms, including can’t, by the students in the interview. We started this part of the conversation by 
referencing Dale’s writing in class earlier. When asked what is the greatest number of berries they could 
get in a day, Dale had written, “You can get any number because it could just keep going.” (This was 
with playing skunk with a die.) The researcher also referred to Dale saying in the interview that it is 
different with the cards because “we can’t keep going.” Again, this is an abbreviated version of the 
conversation that ensued.  
391 Interviewer: That can’t – If you’re wanting to go visit your friend, and your mother or father 
says that you can’t go over to your friend’s house, is it the same kind of can’t 
392 Terry: No, that means you’re not allowed. 
393 Interviewer: Not allowed. So how do you know, if you teacher says that you can’t do 
something, whether she is teaching your something? 
394 Terry: It means no, you’re not allowed to. 
395 Interviewer: You’re not allowed to. 
396: Terry: Yeah. 
397 Interviewer: Of how do you know it’s not the kind of can’t that Dale said? Where it just 
can’t possibly happen? How can you tell the difference? 
398 Terry: By the way she says it. 
399 Chris: Yeah. 
... 
418 Camera operator: When you said earlier “you can’t win,” which one is that closest to? 
Remember, when you looked at your basket and you said, “Oh, we can’t win.” Is that like the 
“you’re not allowed” or is it. 
419 Terry: It would be you can’t. 
420 Leslie: You don’t. 
421 Terry: Like you, it’s impossible, like. 
422 Leslie: Yeah, it’s impossible. 
423 Terry: Well, it was because if you added it all up, the skunk... 
424 Dale: You’d only get, like, fifteen. 
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425 Terry: The skunk would have come. 
426 Chris: Yeah, you’d only get fifteen so if the skunk is that 
427 Leslie: Or seventeen. 
428 Dale: No, because we had thirty-five and then I counted them all up form the five and we 
still wouldn’t have enough. 
429 Interviewer: Okay. 
430 Terry: Because the skunk was gone. 
431 Interviewer: It would have been impossible. 
432 Terry: Yeah, yeah. 
433 Interviewer: So if someone says can’t, … if I told you that you can’t divide by zero in a 
lesson on dividing would you think that that means that you’re not allowed to or that it is 
impossible to do? 
434 Chris: That it is impossible. 
435 Interviewer: Why would you think that?  
436 Terry: Because you can't divide by zero. 
437 Interviewer: Why can’t you? 
438 Terry: Because it is impossible. 
439 Interviewer: How do you know?  
440 Chris: Because you can't. 
441 Terry: Because you can't. 
442 Chris: If it is zero, you can't put it in any groups. 
In this case, Terry introduced the adjective impossible, to clarify the meaning of can’t. No one 
had used the word before this in the interview. As with “have to”, the students distinguished among 
instances of can and can’t based on context. During and after this interview, we wondered how students 
could make this distinction for instances in which they do not know a convincing logical argument for 
the assertion. With the example of division by zero, the students now knew that it is impossible, but how 
might they have thought about it the first time they heard their teacher say, “you can’t divide by zero”? 
Overview of linguistic strategies 
The students introduced three adverbs/adjectives that indicate degrees of probability into the 
interview. The word probably was first used by Leslie and not used again by others. When Leslie and 
Terry were considering whether or not to make the same choice about going home or not as the other 
group, Terry remarked, “One of [our groups] won’t lose everything and the other would” (turn 204), and 
Leslie replied, “It is probably going to be us” (turn 205). The adverbs absolutely and impossible 
(sometimes an adjective) came up in the conversations about language choices when the students were 
trying to explain what the modal expressions meant, as noted above.  
Other modal verbs used included would, which was first used (accidently) by the interviewer and 
used liberally later by the students, and may as in “you may be able to win” (Dale, turn 263).  Another 
specialized linguistic form used by a student was the if-then statement, first used by Chris: “If it was two 
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numbers, then it would make a difference” (turn 39). This was in the context of discussion about the 
playing skunk with a die. 
In addition to the relatively specialist terminology for modality (the modal verbs and adverbs), 
students expressed degrees of certainty in other ways. Terry introduced the modal expression “I think” 
in a conversation about playing skunk with the die. The researcher had asked if the number of berries 
they gathered would be different if the skunk came on a one instead of a six, to which Terry replied, “I 
think it would because we roll the one a lot” (turn 45). Terry introduced another expression to describe 
the differences between playing skunk with cards and with the die. In turn 236 Terry said, “You never 
know what is going to happen (with the die).” Terry also said, “the odds are harder” (line 273) when the 
probability of success became lower. Dale was inventive too, and used the expression “I had a feeling” 
(turn 126) after  “going home” to stay safe. This statement was in reply to the researcher asking, “Did 
you know that this was the skunk?” 
Finally, the absence of any modal expressions is significant in the consideration of modality as 
well. The use of bald assertions can replace strong modal verbs or adverbs. Dale said, “the skunk is right 
there” (line 74) while pointing at the skunk card, as yet unrevealed but evidently the skunk by deduction. 
We might expect “the next one has to be the skunk” or “I am certain that the next one is the skunk” but 
the bald assertions serves the same function. Chris did the same on line 82 saying “it’s there.” In this 
interview (and others), there were many instances of this method for expressing certainty. 
 
Discussion 
The four students in the interview described above demonstrated a wide repertoire of language 
for expressing degrees of certainty. Each of them used a range of expressions, and each of them 
introduced expressions that no one else had used before. Terry was the most talkative in the discussions 
about language meaning, but we caution that it would be unwarranted to make conclusions in 
comparison to the others on this basis. Many of the expressions introduced by the students came late in 
the interview, which tells us that if the interview had been shorter, we would not have known whether or 
not the students had these expressions in their repertoires. This serves as an exemplary caution against 
deficit-based assessments. The development of increasing linguistic strategies may also raise questions 
about the work of Ben-Zvi et al. (2012), cited above — were the participants in that study increasing 
their linguistic strategies or simply waiting to employ their strategies when they are needed? Both are 
reasonable explanations. 
Another phenomenon that challenges deficit-assessment is that when one student said something, 
there was no need for the others to say it again or even speak about it unless they disagreed. We cannot 
assume someone does not possess certain language simply because they do not use it. However, we can 
claim that a student has an expression in their language repertoire if they introduce it. This is why we 
went to the lengths that we did for structuring our prompts carefully. 
Related to this, we note that if students use an expression that has just been used by the teacher 
or interviewer, perhaps in a recent class, or in the interview itself, the student use may not be fully 
independent. They may not be able to use the expression autonomously at a later time or in a different 
context. 
In addition to using (and introducing) specialist language, the students in the interview at times 
demonstrated ability to convey their meaning using very limited technical language. In particular, they 
could make their ideas clear when talking about the extremes of certainty — when events were 
impossible or certain. The more specialised language seemed to be relied upon either for describing 
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events that were somewhere between impossible and certain (aligning with a result from Ben-Zvi et al. 
(2012)), and for clarifying meaning on the extremes when pressed to do so. 
As noted above, Rowland (2000) introduced the idea of the zone of conjectural neutrality to 
describe language that specifies degrees of certainty, which is “in defiance of the cultural norm that the 
pupil is judged to be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’” (p. 211). He claimed it to be helpful for a conjecturing 
atmosphere. We note that the same terminology is used to describe probability, and thus specialized 
modality language can defy situations in which predicted results may be between impossibility and 
certainty. We have only begun to consider the implications for pedagogy considering the phenomenon 
that language is shared for both conjecture and probability spaces. 
This brings us to discussion of the second research context, which was set up to be similar to but 
distinct from the game of skunk — a twist on the context. In both contexts, students were making 
predictions. What is the difference between a train and a pile of cards, both of which are sequences of 
physical objects? One difference is that the cards are shuffled in front of the students and train cars are 
sequenced with some sort of intention in advance. Nevertheless, our experience of real trains is that the 
sequence of cars seems to be quite random, or in groups (e.g., the boxcars first, followed by a bunch of 
tankers, followed by a few flatbeds, and finally the rest of the tankers). We have never seen trains with 
patterns similar to the ones introduced in our research — patterns like yellow boxcar, green tanker, blue 
flatbed, yellow boxcar, green tanker, blue flatbed, etc. A Grade 4 student in the second year of research 
involving the trains became increasingly frustrated with the rest of the class identifying what the 50th car 
would be. This student kept saying that it is impossible to know, while the class continued to ignore him. 
This student refused to make predictions. This reminds us of an observation noted by both Falk (1981) 
and Chernoff (2009) — that people often see randomness when it is not present, and see order when 
randomness is present. 
This tension also points to the presence of some sort of pedagogical contract in which students 
generally expect intention from their teachers. We would suggest that this contract extends to 
researchers, whom, from our experience, are associated with teachers. Even in the game of skunk, when 
the interviewers showed all the cards to the students and shuffled the cards directly in front of them, the 
students sometimes expected some kind of lesson — the appearance of a second skunk card, for instance 
(for example, Chris expressed this fear in the example above). With the trains the phenomenon was 
more obvious; the students (with some exceptions, most notably the Grade 4 student noted above) 
assumed that the patterns would continue even though the researcher and teacher never said that these 
were patterns and the described context was one of a real-life train. The apparent frustration displayed 
by almost all the participants when they saw the fifth train (the random, avant-garde train) made clear to 
us the students’ expectations for pattern. There is something about the transposition of a narrative into a 
mathematics classroom that changes it to a scenario in which everything should be predictable (and 
known by the teacher, or researcher). We suggest that this transposition may confound some claims in 
the literature based on classroom interactions or research interviews about probability. 
In our research project, student predictions were based on both the probabilities inherent in the 
given scenarios and the students’ second-guessing of teacher/research choices in constructing scenarios 
for pedagogic or other reasons. This raises questions about how students experience probability learning. 
Uncertainty in the mathematics classroom is experienced differently than it is outside the classroom. 
Furthermore, we note that the language of conjecture shares language with probability and risk-related 
emotion, and so we wonder whether this ought to confound similarly our understanding of the way 
students experience proof and reasoning. 
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Finally, we turn our attention to implications beyond the classroom. Increasingly significant 
social phenomena, such as climate change, involve both calculations of risk, which are based on 
assumptions, and conjectures (hypotheses). The fact that risk calculation and conjecture share 
terminology may complicate communication about such social phenomena. Furthermore, language used 
to express risk calculation and conjectural language of certainty are also used to express authority, as 
demonstrated in the above conversation about authority — notably the discussion about the modal verbs 
‘have to’ and ‘can’t’. When people in the public sphere who appear to be scientific make claims that 
sound authoritative, how are listeners to know whether these claims are warranted expressions of 
calculation-based certainty? It is incumbent upon mathematics teachers to be aware of these shades of 
meaning and the risk of ambiguity on such important social issues. 
This brings us to the question about what educators might do in the face of the ambiguity in this 
language. Pratt et al. (2012) conclude their study of emotion-laced contexts of risk assessment saying, 
“Teaching about risk carries with it certain obligations. We see one pedagogic challenge as sensitising 
people to their own decision making, including their emotionally-charged heuristic thinking” (p. 940). 
We suggest that this imperative is warranted not only for discussion of emotion but also for discussion 
of linguistic ambiguities. As educators we are obligated to help students and other educators become 
aware of the meaning associated with the language of prediction (uncertainty), emotion, authority, and 
reasoning. The ambiguity of this meaning is probably inevitable however.  First, because uncertainty is 
by nature worrisome and thus triggers emotion.  Second,  people who want to establish authority will co-
opt the language of logic to emphasize what they consider to be necessity. Third, reasoning requires the 
acknowledgment that one might be unsure of an idea. Developing a fuller repertoire of language to 
express ideas may help people negotiate meaning, but will probably not make meaning and meaning-
making entirely clear because of the inherent connections among these concepts. 
Perhaps an appropriate way to close this article is to employ one of the ambiguous expressions 
discussed here — good educators have to (or must) make their students aware of the ambiguity in 
prediction and reasoning language. We have to because it is a moral obligation. And we have to because 
there is no way around this awareness when we aim for clarity. 
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